



Over the past 20 years, much progress has been made in understanding the relations 
between memory and future thinking, and their role in shaping our sense of self and 
identity. My own interest in these research questions owes much to Martial Van der 
Linden, with whom I had the chance to interact closely for several years. The purpose 
of this article is to pay tribute to him by reviewing the work we initiated together on 
autobiographical memory and future-oriented thinking. I first review our early work 
on the relationship between memory and future thinking and discuss their role in self-
representation. Then, I provide an overview of the underlying neural bases and describe 
the alterations of autobiographical thinking that characterize certain psychological 
disorders. Finally, I outline an integrative framework that I recently proposed to 
account for the cognitive structure of past and future autobiographical thinking.
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR:
Arnaud D’Argembeau
Psychology and Neuroscience 
of Cognition Research Unit, 
University of Liège, Place des 





future thinking; self; goals; 
neuroimaging
TO CITE THIS ARTICLE:
D’Argembeau, A. (2021). 
Memory, Future Thinking, and 
the Self. In Honour of Martial 
Van Der Linden. Psychologica 




Memory, Future Thinking, 
and the Self. In Honour of 
Martial Van Der Linden
275D’Argembeau Psychologica Belgica DOI: 10.5334/pb.1074
Our sense of self and identity is based on the construction 
of a life story that integrates and gives meaning to our 
experiences (McAdams, 2001). This personal narrative is 
particularly inhabited by the people who have played a 
prominent role in our lives. For me, Martial Van der Linden 
is certainly one of these important figures who shaped 
part of my identity and determined my professional life. 
The purpose of this article is to pay tribute to him by 
reviewing the work we initiated together on the relations 
between autobiographical memory and future thinking, 
as well as their roles in the construction of the self. First, I 
present our early work on the relations between memory 
and future thinking and describe how it contributed to 
the nascent field of research on episodic future thinking. 
Then, I discuss the roles of autobiographical memories 
and future thoughts in self-representation, provide 
an overview of their neural bases, and describe their 
alterations in some psychological disorders. Finally, I 
briefly sketch an integrative framework that I recently 
proposed to account for the structure of past and future 
autobiographical thinking. Please note that my aim here 
is not to provide a comprehensive review of the role of 
memory and future thinking in the sense of self (see e.g., 
Conway et al., 2019; Fivush, 2011; Klein & Gangi, 2010; 
McAdams, 2013; Prebble et al., 2013), but rather to give 
a glimpse of the path that Martial and I have travelled 
together in exploring this issue.
MEMORY AND FUTURE THINKING ARE 
CLOSELY LINKED
While memory obviously refers to the past, from an 
evolutionary perspective, its fundamental function is 
to aid the organism in anticipating and planning for 
the future (Klein, 2013; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Tulving, 2005). Surprisingly, however, it is only quite 
recently that empirical research on future-oriented 
thinking has taken off. Tulving (1985) was one of the 
first to note the importance of episodic memory for 
imagining the future, based on his observations of an 
amnesic patient. In a seminal paper drawing on Tulving’s 
work, Atance and O’Neill (2001) defined episodic future 
thinking as the “ability to project the self forward in 
time to pre-experience an event” (p. 537). At the time, 
I was investigating the influence of emotion on the 
phenomenological characteristics of autobiographical 
memories as part of my PhD thesis under the supervision 
of Martial (D’Argembeau et al., 2003), and when I first 
read the Atance and O’Neill’s paper, I immediately 
recognized the potential interest of testing the relations 
between memories and future thoughts using our 
measures of phenomenological characteristics. Martial 
was enthusiastic about this idea and thus we decided 
to run a study in which we assessed whether mental 
representations of past and future events were similarly 
influenced by event characteristics; our rationale was 
that if remembering and future thinking are indeed 
related, they should be similarly influenced by features 
of the represented events. To test this hypothesis, we 
manipulated the emotional valence and temporal 
distance of events by asking participants to remember 
positive and negative events that they experienced in 
the recent or distant past (i.e., last year vs. the past 5–10 
years) and to imagine positive and negative events that 
might happen to them in the near or far future (next year 
vs. 5–10 years from now). We found that, although future 
thoughts were generally less detailed than memories, 
the two types of representations were influenced by the 
event characteristics in the same way, with positive and 
temporally close events containing more sensory and 
contextual details than negative and temporally distant 
events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).
In a subsequent study, we sought to gather additional 
evidence for the relationship between remembering 
and future thinking by examining whether individual 
differences in dimensions that affect memory for past 
events similarly influence the experience of projecting 
oneself into the future. We notably found that people 
who possess a higher capacity for visual imagery 
experience more visual and other sensory details both 
when remembering past events and when imagining 
future events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). 
Together, the results of these two studies laid the 
ground for neuroimaging research on episodic future 
thinking (Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007) and 
contributed to theoretical advances in understanding 
the constructive nature of memory and its functions, 
most notably the idea that episodic memory allows 
us to utilize details from past experiences to imagine 
events that have never been experienced as such in the 
past—the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007).
Beyond merely showing that remembering the 
past and imagining the future are closely linked, we 
sought to better understand underlying processes. 
To do so, we examined the extent to which various 
cognitive processes and abilities (i.e., executive control, 
visuospatial processing, relational memory, self-
consciousness, and time perspective) were predictive of 
the accessibility, specificity, and level of detail of mental 
representations of past and future events. We found that 
executive processes, in particular the ability to organize 
and monitor memory retrieval, played a general role in 
accessing and constructing mental representations of 
past and future events at different levels of abstraction, 
whereas visuospatial processing and self-consciousness 
contributed more specifically to the production of sensory 
details when imagining events (D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, 
et al., 2010). These results suggest that future thinking 
involves a collection of component processes that 
support different facets of future event representations.
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The subjective experience of projecting oneself into 
the future is indeed a complex, multi-dimensional 
phenomenon that not only involves the construction 
of a mental scene (as is the case for any imagined 
event) but also a sense of “pre-experiencing” the future 
(Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Tulving, 1985). Understanding 
the determinants of these phenomenological qualities 
is important because they shape our beliefs about what 
might lie ahead (Ernst & D’Argembeau, 2017), and in turn 
influence our decisions and actions (Libby et al., 2007). 
To shed light on this issue, Martial and I investigated the 
specific contribution of various event features to different 
aspects of the phenomenology of episodic future thoughts 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012). We found that 
the vividness of an episodic future thought was largely 
dependent on the familiarity of its constitutive elements 
(i.e., the envisioned location, persons and objects). More 
importantly, the subjective sense of pre-experiencing the 
future was not only based on the sensory–perceptual 
qualities of the mental representation but was also 
modulated by the personal importance of the imagined 
event. This latter finding led us to suggest that the 
essence of episodic future thinking—the sensation of 
mentally visiting one’s personal future—lies, in part, in 
the connection of imagined events with personal goals, 
an idea that is developed in the next section.
THE ROLES OF PAST AND FUTURE 
THOUGHTS IN SELF-REPRESENTATION
An important function of autobiographical memory is 
to support our sense of self and identity (Conway et al., 
2004; Fivush, 2011; Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 
2001; Prebble et al., 2013). As object of knowledge, the 
self relies on a multi-layered representational structure 
that includes abstract representations of our personal 
characteristics such as our traits (e.g., “I am timid”), 
general knowledge about the periods and events 
that constitute our life (e.g., “when I was in primary 
school, we used to visit my grandma on Sundays”), and 
memories of specific happenings in our past (e.g., “the 
time I broke my leg in grandma’s garden”) (Conway, 
2005). These different forms of self-knowledge are 
functionally isolable; for example, amnesic patients 
are able to make trait self-descriptiveness judgements 
despite their inability to recollect personal events 
relevant to those judgements (Klein & Lax, 2010). Under 
normal circumstances, however, the different layers of 
self-representation interact closely with each other, such 
that memories of past experiences sustain and exemplify 
our images of ourselves (Charlesworth et al., 2016; Grilli, 
2017; Rathbone et al., 2008). In particular, a special class 
of memories—referred to as self-defining memories—
serve as the building blocks of narrative identity—the 
stories we construct about the self to develop and sustain 
a sense of personal unity and purpose (McAdams, 2001; 
Singer et al., 2013). These are vivid, affectively intense, 
and often-rehearsed memories that involve important 
themes and concerns in our life (e.g., achievement, 
intimacy) (Singer & Moffitt, 1991). The process of 
linking these recollected experiences to the conceptual 
structures of the self is key to the construction of life 
narratives and is generally predictive of psychological 
health and well-being (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Philippe 
et al., 2012; Singer et al., 2013; Thorne et al., 2004).
Our self-image is of course not limited to the past but 
also includes representations of what we might become, 
would like to become, and are afraid of becoming in 
the future (Markus & Nurius, 1986). The sense of self 
and identity can thus be fostered by the imagination 
of meaningful events that we anticipate to happen in 
the future; indeed, several studies have shown that 
future events are, on average, considered as more 
important to the self than past events (e.g., Addis et 
al., 2008; Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2006). To shed light on this future aspect of 
the self-image, Martial and I introduced the notion of 
self-defining future projection as the future counterpart 
of self-defining memories: a subcategory of imagined 
future events that relate to important personal goals 
and provide key information for self-understanding 
(D’Argembeau, Lardi, et al., 2012). In the same way that 
self-defining memories support conceptual knowledge 
about present and past selves, self-defining future 
projections ground and exemplify our conceptions of 
ourselves in the future. For example, a teenager who 
envisions her future self as a mother may nourish this 
self-image with the imagination of future scenarios that 
incarnate this possible self (e.g., imagining herself at the 
maternity hospital, taking the children to school, playing 
with them in the backyard, and so on). In two studies, 
we found that people can readily produce these types of 
self-defining future events and that individual differences 
in the characteristics of self-defining narratives manifest 
themselves in similar ways for past and future events 
(D’Argembeau, Lardi, et al., 2012). Furthermore, as with 
self-defining memories, self-defining future projections 
not only represent the concrete content of future events 
but also sometimes their broader meaning and potential 
implications for the self. Continuing this line of research, 
Demblon and D’Argembeau (2017) showed that self-
defining memories and future thoughts are organized 
in networks of events according to their themes and 
identity motives (e.g., efficacy, belongingness, self-
esteem, and so on).
At the heart of future-oriented self-representations 
lie the articulation of and investment in personal goals 
(McAdams, 2013). Generally speaking, goals are cognitive 
representations of desired states or outcomes (Austin & 
Vancouver, 1996), and personal goals can be defined as 
personally salient objectives that people pursue in their 
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lives (Emmons, 1986; Little, 1983; Milyavskaya & Werner, 
2018). Goal-related knowledge is represented at different 
levels of abstraction, from very general aspirations (e.g., 
being a successful person) to concrete and specific 
objectives (e.g., striving to arrive at a particular meeting 
on time); these different goal representations are 
organized in a hierarchy in which higher-order goals 
determine the content of lower-order goals (Austin 
& Vancouver, 1996). Thus, an important function of 
episodic future thinking is to provide a detailed, quasi-
experiential representation—a simulation—of what it 
would be like to be in a desired end state, and to mentally 
try out various steps and consider potential obstacles to 
reaching that state (D’Argembeau, 2016). According to 
this view, personal goals drive and constrain future event 
representations, which in turn motivate and guide goal 
pursuit. And indeed, research has shown that personal 
goals play a prominent role in the construction and 
organization of episodic future thoughts (Ben Malek et 
al., 2018; D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; D’Argembeau 
& Mathy, 2011; Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016).
Another important dimension of the self-image is its 
emotional valence. Most people hold flattering views 
of themselves and process information in ways that 
maintain or increase the positivity of their self-image 
(Leary, 2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). One way in 
which this positivity bias manifests itself is in how people 
envision their personal future (Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Our work has indeed shown that positive future thoughts 
are represented more vividly than negative future 
thoughts (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; see also 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013) and are experienced more 
frequently in daily life (Barsics et al., 2016; D’Argembeau 
et al., 2011). This positivity bias appears to be particularly 
pronounced for self-defining events and may help 
support self-esteem (D’Argembeau, Lardi, et al., 2012; 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008) and stimulate 
goal-directed behaviour (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2007).
THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL THINKING
Martial played an important role in the introduction of 
neuroimaging techniques at the University of Liège in the 
90s (see e.g. Salmon et al., 1996). A the end of his career, 
however, he was somewhat critical of neuroimaging 
studies and was convinced of their usefulness only insofar 
as they informed and constrained cognitive theories (for 
further discussion, see Henson, 2005; Mather et al., 2013). 
In my view, research on autobiographical memory and 
self-referential processing is one area in which functional 
brain imaging contributed significantly to understanding 
the cognitive architecture underlying self-representation. 
For example, the finding that imagining the future 
depends on much of the same neural machinery that is 
needed for remembering the past played a key role in 
the development of novel theoretical perspectives on the 
functions of memory (Schacter et al., 2007).
Neuroimaging studies have also played a role in 
dissecting different forms of self-representation and 
identifying their underlying commonalities and differences. 
For example, representations of personal traits, knowledge 
of personal facts, and memories of specific events are 
associated with unique brain activations, showing that 
different types of self-representation are dissociable 
(Martinelli et al., 2013). Importantly, however, the brain 
regions that have been associated with different types 
of self-representation—including the medial prefrontal 
cortex, medial and lateral temporal areas, the posterior 
cingulate cortex, and inferior parietal lobes (Kim, 2012; 
Renoult et al., 2012; Svoboda et al., 2006)—are highly 
interconnected and form a coherent network (which 
largely corresponds to the “default network”; Buckner 
et al., 2008), thereby supporting the view that distinct 
self-knowledge domains interact closely with each other 
(Conway, 2005).
In our own work, we used neuroimaging to test the 
hypothesis that autobiographical reasoning—a process of 
reflective thinking through which we form links between 
disparate elements of our life and the self (Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000)—is more than the mere remembering of past 
events (D’Argembeau et al., 2014). During fMRI scanning, 
participants were asked to approach a set of self-defining 
memories in two different ways: in some trials, they 
remembered the concrete content of the events, whereas 
in other trials they reflected on the broader meaning 
and implications of their memories. We found that a 
number of brain regions within the autobiographical 
memory network showed differential activity depending 
on the way people approached the same self-defining 
memories. Specifically, a left-lateralized network 
composed of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, inferior 
frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus and angular gyrus 
was more active when participants reflected on the 
personal significance and implications of their memories 
(i.e., autobiographical reasoning), whereas other brain 
regions commonly engaged in autobiographical memory 
retrieval (i.e., the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, 
precuneus, amygdala/hippocampus, parahippocampal 
gyrus, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and medial 
orbitofrontal cortex) showed higher activation when 
participants focused on the concrete content of the 
events and attempted to re-experience them in their 
original context. These findings support the notion that 
autobiographical reasoning and the construction of 
personal narratives go beyond mere remembering in 
that they require deriving meaning and value from past 
experiences.
The role of personal goals in episodic future thinking 
discussed above is also supported by neuroimaging 
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evidence. If goal processing is an integral part of episodic 
future thinking, it should be associated with specific 
regions within the brain network that is activated when 
imagining future events (Benoit & Schacter, 2015). To 
test this hypothesis, we asked people to imagine future 
events that were related to their personal goals, as well 
as future events that were plausible but unrelated to 
their goals, and found that the medial prefrontal cortex 
and other midline regions were more activated when 
imagining goal-related future events (D’Argembeau, 
Stawarczyk, et al., 2010). Furthermore, meta-analyses 
of neuroimaging studies of episodic future thinking, on 
the one hand, and of personal goal processing, on the 
other hand, showed that the two sets of studies were 
associated with overlapping activation in several brain 
regions and most notably in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the medial prefrontal cortex 
may contribute to the processing of personal goals when 
imagining future events.
Although the medial prefrontal cortex is consistently 
involved in episodic future thinking, and more generally 
in self-referential thinking, its exact function remains 
unclear. One possibility is that it plays a role in appraising 
or representing the subjective value or significance of self-
related information (D’Argembeau, 2013). This account 
is supported, for example, by the finding that medial 
prefrontal activity increases linearly with the personal 
importance of self-referential contents (Andrews-Hanna 
et al., 2010; D’Argembeau, Jedidi, et al., 2012). Another, 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, possibility is that the 
medial prefrontal cortex mediates the integration of 
multiple representational levels during self-referential 
thought (see e.g. Brod et al., 2013, for evidence that the 
medial prefrontal cortex is involved in the integration of 
information to pre-existing knowledge structures). For 
example, when people engage in episodic future thinking, 
the medial prefrontal cortex may integrate imagined 
events with higher-order autobiographical knowledge, 
and may organize specific events in broader themes and 
causal sequences. Supporting this view, we found that the 
processing of event clusters (i.e., events that are part of 
higher-order themes and sequences) is associated with 
increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex and 
with greater functional connectivity between the medial 
prefrontal cortex and posterior regions supporting episodic 
and semantic representations (Demblon et al., 2016).
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL THINKING AND 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Many psychological disorders—including depression, 
anxiety, schizophrenia, substance abuse, and personality 
disorders—are associated with deficits and/or biases in 
autobiographical memory and future thinking (for reviews, 
see Brunette & Schacter, 2021; Hallford et al., 2018; 
Williams et al., 2007). Understanding the mechanisms 
underlying these alterations and designing interventions 
to address them became one of Martial’s most important 
interests in the latter part of his career.
Stéphane Raffard and I contributed to this endeavour 
by looking specifically at disturbances of autobiographical 
thinking in schizophrenia. To my knowledge, we were 
the first to provide formal evidence that individuals with 
schizophrenia not only have difficulties in remembering 
specific events from their personal past but are even more 
impaired at imagining specific events that might happen 
in their personal future (D’Argembeau et al., 2008). These 
difficulties in remembering the past and imagining the 
future may in part be due to deficits in the process of 
scene construction (i.e., the ability to mentally generate 
and maintain a complex and coherent scene). Indeed, 
when attempting to construct mental representations 
of scenes, individuals with schizophrenia report fewer 
sensory descriptions and spatial references than healthy 
individuals, and their descriptions lack spatial coherence 
and are more fragmented (Raffard, D’Argembeau, 
Bayard, et al., 2010).
Considering the role of autobiographical memories and 
future thoughts in the development and maintenance of 
the self, these deficits in autobiographical thinking might 
in part explain the alterations in the sense of continuity 
of self that are observed in schizophrenia (Mishara 
et al., 2014). To examine this possibility, we conducted 
a series of studies to investigate the characteristics 
of self-defining memories and future thoughts in 
schizophrenia. We found that patients recall as many 
specific self-defining memories as healthy individuals, 
but their narratives are less elaborate and include fewer 
connections with the self (Raffard, D’Argembeau, Lardi, 
et al., 2010; Raffard et al., 2009). In the same vein, they 
have difficulty thinking about the broader meaning 
and implications of important future events (Raffard 
et al., 2016). Furthermore, the peak of the temporal 
distribution of self-defining memories (the so-called 
reminiscence bump; Rubin et al., 1998) occurs at an 
earlier age in patients with schizophrenia, which might 
reflect alterations in identity development (Raffard, 
D’Argembeau, Lardi, et al., 2010). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that patients with schizophrenia have 
difficulty organizing and extracting meaning from their 
experiences to create coherent self-narratives.
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF 
THE COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE OF 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL THINKING
The research program that I initiated with Martial more 
than 15 years ago (and that I have pursued with my team 
to this day) has recently led me to propose a theoretical 
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framework to account for the cognitive architecture of 
autobiographical thinking (D’Argembeau, 2020). This 
integrative framework is very much inspired by Martin 
Conway’s view on the organization of autobiographical 
memory (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000) and extends its scope to future thinking (Conway 
et al., 2019).
The basis of this proposal is that autobiographical 
thinking relies on two interacting systems, namely 
event simulation and autobiographical knowledge. 
The event simulation system allows one to mentally 
simulate specific episodes based on details from prior 
experiences (drawn from episodic memory; Schacter 
& Addis, 2007) and semantic knowledge (notably, 
event schema; Irish & Piguet, 2013). Such simulations 
rely on mental imagery and modality-specific systems 
for perception, action, emotion, and introspection 
(Barsalou, 2008), their function being to provide a 
representation of the experiential content of events from 
an egocentric perspective—they depict what it would be 
like to experience the simulated event. Remembering 
past events and imagining future events both involve 
simulation processes (Addis, 2020), but as such, event 
simulations are atemporal in nature, in that they lack 
a broader temporal context that situates events in 
the past, present, or future. The temporal context of 
event simulations is provided by autobiographical 
knowledge, which forms a cognitive representational 
system—a personal timeline—onto which simulated 
events can be mapped. Autobiographical knowledge 
involves conceptual/propositional representations, which 
organize information about the content and structure of 
one’s past, present, and future life in hierarchical layers 
referring to different temporal scopes (from lifetime 
periods that encompass years to events occurring on 
specific days). According to this view, the subjective 
temporality of memories and future thoughts does not 
lie in event simulations per se but in the synergy between 
event simulations and autobiographical knowledge (for 
more detail, see D’Argembeau, 2020).
The nature and level of specificity of autobiographical 
thinking depends on which system is active at a given 
moment. Autobiographical knowledge about the past 
and future (including knowledge about the occurrence 
of specific events) can be accessed without necessarily 
representing the experiential content of events, resulting 
in abstract forms of autobiographical thinking (e.g., 
quickly reviewing the main chapters that constitute 
one’s life; Thomsen, 2009). The subjective experience 
of “revisiting” the past or “pre-experiencing” the future 
occurs only when event simulations are constructed 
and integrated with higher-order autobiographical 
knowledge, resulting in the feeling of mental time 
travel (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012; Ernst & 
D’Argembeau, 2017). The diversity of autobiographical 
thoughts we experience in daily life—concrete or 
abstract, imagery-based or language-based, near or far, 
past or future—is generated by the constant dance of 
the two systems.
CONCLUSION
Memories of significant events are like pieces of a 
puzzle that create parts of our identity. The moments 
I remember spending with Martial certainly played 
such a role in shaping my identity as a researcher and 
I am grateful to him for that. The research we initiated 
together has contributed to a better understanding 
of how the weaving of our memories defines who we 
are now and shapes who we aspire to be in the future. 
Shedding further light on the nature of autobiographical 
thought processes might ultimately help people restore 
meaning and purpose in life, a much needed endeavour 
in these difficult times (de Jong et al., 2020).
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